Craig Munns has a large model of a T rex on his desk. He got it with a magazine subscription two decades ago. One day, a few years ago, he was sitting in his study, which was dense with books and yellow sticky notes and posters charting evolution from single cells upward, and he thought, “What am I going to do next in my life?” And his eyes lit upon the T rex.
Credit: ExpressVPN
，这一点在有道翻译中也有详细论述
“It’s a massive problem, that this $5 trillion industry is essentially operating at a 1% margin,” said O’Hara. “Hospitals are almost forecasting into a fog.”
The common law’s fictional contrivance to treat “substantial certainty” of harm as equivalent to an intention of harm, for purposes of liability in battery and the other intentional torts, is in part an implicit recognition that substantially certain injurers are often no less culpable than intentional injurers and thus properly exposed to a similar scope of liability. To be sure, this fictional contrivance serves multiple ends; so, for example, substantial certainty can function as an evidential proxy for an actual intention of harm, thus obviating the difficulties that might attend a plaintiff’s attempt to establish that the defendant actually intended her harm. But such a function could also be served by treating substantial certainty as raising an extremely strong but defeasible inference of actual intent and imposing upon the defendant the burden of undercutting this inference. That no such modification of the current regime has been entertained is some further indication that the fiction also serves other ends.